Contemporary issues in corporate governance of state-owned enterprises What can Hungary learn?

 Polgári Szemle· 22. évfolyam 4–6. szám, 2026, 103–116., DOI: 10.24307/psz.2026.0509

ROLAND TARDI, PhD Candidate, Mathias Corvinus Collegium / Corvinus University of Budapest

Summary:

Contemporary corporate governance research is shifting from static monitoring checklists to dynamic, strategy-aligned capabilities. Concurrently, state capitalism is experiencing a global resurgence driven by geopolitical competition, techno-nationalism, and crisis management. Within these broader trends, this paper focuses on the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises (SOE). The literature presents a significant debate regarding SOE reforms: while formal structural interventions like mixed ownership or mandated independence are widely implemented, their impact on performance remains highly contingent and is frequently neutralised by political interference. This study examines how internal governance mechanisms interact with external market forces and the complex dual accountability structures of SOEs. The central finding is that formal structural compliance remains largely inert on its own. To activate measurable organisational benefits, internal governance mechanisms require the external catalyst of genuine product market competition and substantive, non-politically entrenched human capital. Ultimately, effective SOE governance requires expanding beyond narrow agency frameworks to address owner heterogeneity and the inherent tension between financial profit maximisation and political legitimacy.

Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: G34

Keywords: corporate governance, state-owned enterprises, governance mechanisms